

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 7519

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR EG US IS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SADAT

SUMMARY: MET WITH FAHMY AND SEPARATELY, WITH SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN ALEXANDRIA TODAY TO PRESENT POINTS IN TALKING PAPER. SINCE RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS HAD GIVEN RISE HERE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS, FAHMY ADVISED I STRESS OUR BELIEF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. I DID SO. RESULTS OF MEETINGS WERE GENERALLY GOOD. SADAT FULLY ACCEPTED SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL PROPOSALS RE THE VARIOUS LINES. RE PASSES, HE AND FAHMY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ISRAELIS BEING OUT AND LIKED OUR PROPOSAL TO SEND SOMEONE TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE DETERMINATION. SADAT AGREED THAT, IN THIS ROUND, HE SHOULD INSIST UPON US MANNING OF UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, AND THAT HE WILL DURING SHUTTLE EFFORT ACCEPT ISRAELI MANNING WITH AMERICAN CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT AS EGYPTIAN CONCESSION. THIS SHOULD BE IN RETURN FOR THE TWO WARNING STATIONS THAT EGYPTIANS WANT ON COASTAL AND ISMAILIA ROADS. HE IS UNABLE RPT UNABLE TO ACCEPT ISRAELI MANNING OF HAMAN FAROUN STATION, BUT IS AGREEABLE TO US CIVILIAN OR UN MANNING. HE ACCEPTS YOUR IDEAS ON THE ACCESS CORRIDOR AND ALSO AGREES TO JOINT USE OF THE TWO ROADS AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE PENDING SITING AND BUILDING A NEW PARALLEL ROAD. USE ON ALTERNATE DAYS IS AGREEABLE TO HIM, PROVIDED HE IS ASSURED THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS. UN CHECKPOINT ACCEPTABLE. MODALITIES CAN BE WORKED

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OUT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS SPECIFIC QUERY, I ASSURED HIM THAT

PRESIDENT FORD ENDORSES YOUR SUGGESTIONS. IN CONCLUSION, SADAT INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO MOVE RAPIDLY AND OFFERED SEND ME BY PRESIDENTIAL MYSTERE AIRCRAFT TO BUCHAREST AUGUST 2 IF THIS WILL HELP EXPEDITE PROCESS. HE ALSO OFFERED MAKE MYSTERE AVAILABLE FOR BELGRADE TRIP, IF THIS IS PREFERABLE. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR WISHES. END SUMMARY

1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MEETINGS IN ALEXANDRIA, FIRST WITH FAHMY ALONE AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BOTH MEETINGS WENT VERY WELL. IN EACH CASE, I MADE PRESENTATION OUTLINED IN THE TALKING PAPER YOU APPROVED AS MODIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAMS. RATHER THAN DETAIL PRESENTATION, I WILL SUMMARIZE SALIENT POINTS OF THE TWO MEETINGS BELOW:

2. MEETING WITH FAHMY: FAHMY, WHO RECEIVED ME AT HIS BEACH CABIN IN MONTAZA, SEEMED RELAXED AND EXPECTANT. I MENTIONED YOU HAD INDICATED THAT YOU WANTED ME TO SPEAK TO HIM FIRST IN ORDER TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS ON VARIOUS POINTS. FAHMY IMMEDIATELY ASKED ABOUT THE PASSES. I TOLD HIM THAT, SINCE THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY ARE OUT OF THE GIDI AND MITLA PASSES, WE PROPOSE TO SEND SOMEONE TO DETERMINE OBJECTIVELY IF THEY ARE IN FACT OUT. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. HE OPINED THAT, FROM SADAT'S POINT OF VIEW, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE ISRAELIS OUT OF THE PASSES. IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IF THEY ARE A COUPLE OF HUNDRED METERS OUT OR A KILOMETER, JUST SO THEY ARE OUT. ON THE OTHER POINTS, FAHMY OPPOSED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ISRAELIS MAN THE HAMAM FAROUN MONITORING STATION. THIS, HE SAID, IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SADAT TO ACCEPT. "WE CANNOT HAVE THE ISRAELIS AMONG US IN THAT AREA," WAS THE WAY HE PUT IT. THE HAMAM FAROUN STATION SHOULD BE US MANNED. HE ALSO REITERATED THE DIFFICULTIES SADAT WOULD HAVE WITH THE US MILITARY POSTS. WE EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICANS BEING IN THE UMM KHUSHAIB STATION AND PERHAPS IN THE PROPOSED MILITARY POSTS UNDER SOME KIND OF UNTSO UMBRELLA. FAHMY THOUGHT THIS WAS POSSIBLE, BUT NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD THEN ALSO EXPECT TO BE IN. SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THIS GAVE HIM NO PROBLEM, SINCE HE FELT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS THE FEELING THAT THEY ARE PARTICIPATING. HE WAS SURE, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER THE US NOR ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO SOVIETS BEING INVOLVED. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SEE HOW IN ANY UNTSO TYPE ARRANGEMENT

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SOME KIND OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION COULD BE AVOIDED, HE UNDERTOOK TO THINK MORE ABOUT IT AND GIVE US ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS THAT MAY OCCUR TO HIM.

3. FAHMY THEN ARRANGED THAT THE TWO OF US GO TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT MAMURA. BEFORE WE LEFT, HE STRESSED THAT I SHOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT YOU BELIEVE THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE AND THAT I DO SO AT THE VERY OUTSET TO KEEP THE MEETING

ON THE UPBEAT. THIS WAS DESIRABLE, HE STATED, SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE OBVIOUSLY ALTERED THEIR POSITION VERY MUCH AND RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS HAVE RAISED SOME DOUBTS AS TO THEIR INTENTIONS. I AGREED TO DO SO.

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

4. MEETING WITH SADAT: IN ADDITION TO FAHMY, SADAT HAD WITH HIM VICE PRESIDENT MOBAREK, PRIMIN SALEM AND GAMASY. ALL LISTENED INTENTLY TO MY PRESENTATION. FOLLOWING AHMY'S ADVICE, I FIRST STATED THAT, DESPITE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL WAS "SUBSTANTIALLY UNACCEPTABLE," THEY WANT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IT REMAINS YOUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ONE AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS ARE INTENDED TO PERMIT RAPID PROGRESS. THIS HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON SADAT. I THEN WENT THROUGH THE POINTS IN THE TALKING PAPER BUT AVOIDED BEING TOO PRECISE. SADAT'S COMMENTS THEREON FOLLOW:

A. LINES: THE PRESIDENT FULLY ACCEPTED THE SEVERAL LINES YOU SUGGEST AS WELL AS YOUR PROPOSED TACTICS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE EGYPTIAN FALLBACK PROPOSAL TO MOVE THEIR MAIN FORCE EAST OF THE CANAL HAD BEEN FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES AND THAT HE HAD NOT EXPECTED IT TO BE SALEABLE. I REMINDED HIM PROPOSAL HAS NOT YET BEEN PRESENTED TO ISRAELIS.

B. PASSES: LIKE FAHMY, SADAT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISRAELIS BEING OUT OF THE PASSES. IF WHAT THEY SAY IS TRUE, HE

NOTED, THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THEIR MAP SHOWS OTHERWISE AND SOME OF THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST THAT THEY STELL PROPOSE TO BE TWO OR THREE KILOMETERS IN THE PASSES. HE LIKED THE IDEA OF AN AMERICAN EXPERT BEING SENT TO DETERMINE
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OBJECTIVELY WHERE THE EASTERN PASS ENTRANCES ARE.

C. MONITORING STATIONS: ON THE UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, HE AGREED TO INSIST IN THIS ROUND ON US MANNING, KNOWING THAT HE CANNOT GET SAME. HE IS PREPARED , IN THE LATER STATES OF THE SHUTTLE EFFORT, TO AGREE TO ISRAELI MANNING WITH US CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION IN RETURN FOR THE TWO EGYPTIAN WARNING STATIONS ON THE COASTAL AND ISMAILIA ROADS. HE WAS PLEASED THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT THESE TWO WARNING STATIONS. (GAMASY INDICATED THAT THESE TWO WARNING STATIONS SHOULD HAVE RADAR.) HE DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT AN EGYPTIAN STATION NEAR THE MITLA PASS.

HOWEVER, SADAT SAID HE COULD NOT RPT NOT AGREE TO ISRAELI MANNING OF THE HAMAM FAROUN STATION. HE ECHOED FAHMY'S WORDS THAT THE EGYPTIANS CANNOT HAVE THE ISRAELIS LIVING AMONG THEM. INSTEAD, THE PROPOSED HAMAM FAROUN STATION SHOULD BE ENTIRELY MANNED AND ADMINISTERED BY US CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. UNLIKE THE UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, THERE IS NO RPT NO PRESENT STATION AT HAMAM FAROUN; HENCE OPERATING ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE DEVELOPED FROM SCRATCH WITHOUT ANYONE HAVING TO LEAVE. ALTERNATIVELY, UN MANNING AND ADMINISTRATION IS ACCEPTABLE.

D. US MILITARY POSTS: PURSUANT SECTO 046, I HAD SOFTENED THE TALKING PAPER ON THE PROPOSED SIX US MILITARY POSTS. I TOLD SADAT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN HAVING SIX SUCH POSTS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT COULD OF COURSE REFUSE THEM, THEY COULD BECOME SOMEWHAT OF A STICKING POINT, ALTHOUGH YOU DO NOT CONSIDER THEM A BREAK-OFF ISSUE. WE COULD DISCUSS THESE LATER ON. SADAT'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT HE COULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT US MILITARY POSTS. HE REITERATED HIS EARLIER POINT THAT, HAVING EXPELLED THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS, HE COULD NOT RPT NOT NOW BRING IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY WITHOUT INCURRING CRITICISM AT HOME, FROM OTHER ARABS AND FROM THE SOVIETS. I POINTED OUT THAT THE TWO PROPOSED POSTS IN THE GIDI AREA COULD BE REPRESENTED AS AN EXTENSION OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE AT UMM KHUSHAIB AND SERVE AS A USEFUL CHECKPOINT TO ENSURE THAT THE ISRAELIS GOING TO UMM KHUSHAIB ARE NOT ARMED. HE LIKED THAT IDEA. I ALSO MENTIONED YOUR BELIEF THAT THE SIX MIGHT BE REDUCED BY TWO. GAMASY WANTED TO KNOW WHICH TWO. I SAID THIS WAS A MATTER THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. I TRIED TO ASCERTAIN IF THE PRESIDENT HAS A FEASIBLE
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FALLBACK POSITION ON THESE POSTS, INDICATING THAT THIS
COULD BE SOLELY FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND WOULD NOT BE PASSED TO
THE ISRAELIS. HE WAS EQUIVOCAL IN HIS REPLY. IN PRINCIPLE HE
OPPOSES THE CONCEPT OF US MILITARY POSTS, BUT I GAINED THE
IMPRESSION THAT IF THEY COULD BE SET UP UNDER SOME KIND OF AN
UMBRELLA (SUCH AS UNTSO) HE MIGHT ACQUIESCE. HE SAID HE WOULD WANT
TO THINK ABOUT THIS A BIT MORE AND AGREED THAT THE MATTER MIGHT
BE DISCUSSED LATER.

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E. ACCESS CORRIDOR: SADAT AGREED TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL
ON THE SOUTHERN END. HE ALSO AGREED TO THE HAMAM FAROUN SECTOR
BEING UNDER THE UN WITH ONLY NOMINAL EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN
ADMINISTRATION. THIS, HE SAID, WE CAN WORK OUT IN SOME WAY.

F. SOUTHERN ROADS: AFTER I HAD GONE THROUGH MY POINTS ON THE
SOUTHERN ROADS, POINTING OUT THE PRACTICAL, TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
INVOLVED, SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES HELD ABOUT A TEN-MINUTE
DISCUSSION AMONG THEMSELVES ON THE SUBJECT. SADAT ULTIMATELY SAID
HE AGREES WITH OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE US EXPERTS PARTICIPATE WITH
THE ISRAELIS IN A TECHNICAL SURVEY TO FIND A PLACE FOR ANOTHER
ROAD. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESENT ROAD COULD BE JOINTLY USED.
THIS, HE EMPHASIZED, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A NEW ROAD HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED. ADDITIONALLY,
HE EMPHASIZED THERE MUST BE NO RPT NO ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS ON THE

ROAD, ALTHOUGH A UN CHECKPOINT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. I AGAIN ASSURED HIM THAT HE WILL HAVE OUR FULL SUPPORT TO INSURE THAT EVENTS OF THE SUEZ ROAD WILL NOT RPT NOT BE REPEATED AND THAT WE HAVE AN ASSURANCE FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT STOP OR INVESTIGATE EGYPTIAN TRUCKS. SADAT INDICATED HE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES OF HANDLING THE ROAD.

5. AT THE END OF MY PRESENTATION, I OUTLINED FOR SADAT THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES WE DISCUSSED, E.E. A) EGYPTIANS WOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD SOME TEN KILOMETERS FROM THEIR PASSES OR SO, B) THE ISRAELIS
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WOULD WITHDRAW SOME 30-40 KILOMETERS, C) THERE WOULD BE UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THE OILFIELDS, D) THE OILFIELDS WOULD BE RETURNED TO EGYPT. SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES SEEMED PLEASED. HE ASKED IF PRESIDENT FORD ALSO SUPPRTS THIS PROPOSAL. I TOLD HIM I HAD MET BRIEFLY WITH THE PRESIDENT IN BONN, THAT I KNEW YOU HAD DISCUSSED THE WHOLE MATTER WITH HIM A DAY OR SO EARLIER, AND THAT SADAT COULD BE SURE THAT PRESIDENT FORD IS BEHIND WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING TO HIM AND SUPPORTS IT. THI ALSO PLEASED HIM. HE REITERATED THAT HE WOULD HONOR THE COMMITMENTS HE HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT FORD AND TO YOU AT SALZBURG AND ASWAN.

6. IN CONCLUDING, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ENVISAGE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS A KIND OF HOLDING OPERATION TO ALLOW TIME TO PREPARE TO MOVE TOWARD AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL SOME TIME IN 1977. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO CONSULT WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE PUTTING FORTH ANY PROPOSAL, WE WILL MAKE OUR COMMITMENT AMBIGUOUS. FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT WE SHOULD ALSO GIVE SADAT A COMMITMENT TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL IN 1977. I SAID I WAS AUTHORIZED TO REITERATE TO HIM THAT, IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE MOST PROPITIOUS TIME TO BEGIN TO PUSH FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IS 1977, I.E. AFTER OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. SADAT READILY ACCEPTED THIS.

7. SADAT THEN WANTED TO KNOW JUST HOW QUICKLY WE CAN MOVE AHEAD. I RECALLED I HAD TOLD HIM IN OUR LAST MEETING THAT, ONCE IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE TWO POSITIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE TO ASSURE THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED, YOU ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN ANOTHER SHUTTLE EFFORT. YOU HAD TALKED ABOUT DOING SO TOWARD THE END OF AUGUST WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FINISHING BEFORE THE UNGA. AGAIN SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES LIKED THIS.

8. FINALLY, I TOLD SADAT THAT WE HAD ARRANGED THAT I MEET YOU IN BELGRADE ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 3, SO THAT I CAN BRIEF YOU IN DETAIL. SADAT SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDITING THINGS, I MEET WITH YOU IN BUCHAREST. I TOLD HIM THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE FLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS OUT OF CAIRO FOR BUCHAREST. HE THEREUPON INSTRUCTED VP MOBAREK TO PLACE HIS PRESIDENTIAL MYSTERE AT MY

DISPOSAL TO FLY ME TO BUCHAREST OR BELGRADE, WHCHEVER WE
PREFER. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU WISH ME TO ARRANGE TO MEET
WITH YOU IN BUCHAREST ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, INSTEAD OF BELGRADE,
AUGUST 3. IF SO, I SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH FAHMY TOMORROW (HE
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IS STILL IN ALEXANDRIA) TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENT.
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